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Does insiders share pledging stifle innovation? Evidence from China

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  • Wang, Qiong
  • Qiu, Muqing
  • Tan, Wenhao

Abstract

We examine the relation between insiders share pledging activities for personal loans and firm innovation. Firstly, we find a negative effect of both the existence of pledging and the intensity of pledging activities on firm innovation, measured by R&D and patent application. Pledging by insiders with decision rights is associated with a 4.6% decline in R&D activities and 0.5% decline in patent applications, respectively, which accounts for 4.0% and 10.6% of the mean of each variable. This result holds using a propensity-score matched sample. In addition, we instrument pledging activities by financing constraints faced by other firms controlled by the same controlling insiders who pledge shares. IV estimation yield similar results. Secondly, we find share pledge activities have more pronounced effect on firm innovations when firms are located in areas with strong property rights protection, when firms are non-SOEs, or when pledging insiders serve on corporate boards. Lastly, we also find a negative effect of share pledging of other firms with common shareholders on firm innovations of interest. Overall, our findings suggest that pledging shares by insiders stifle firm innovation because share pledging reduce insiders' preference for risk taking.

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  • Wang, Qiong & Qiu, Muqing & Tan, Wenhao, 2020. "Does insiders share pledging stifle innovation? Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:72:y:2020:i:c:s1057521920302143
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101570
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    Cited by:

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    2. Su, Zili, 2023. "Essays on equity incentive and share pledging in China," Other publications TiSEM fb4495ee-f9bc-45c7-9d85-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Zhou, Jingting & Li, Wanli & Yan, Ziqiao & Lyu, Huaili, 2021. "Controlling shareholder share pledging and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    4. Yan, Guan & Liu, Zhidong, 2023. "Interconnectedness of financial institutions based on pledged shares in China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    5. Jose, Amal & Bhaduri, Saumitra, 2024. "Promoter's share pledging and investment–The role of financial constraints," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PA).
    6. Tian, Zhongliang & Tang, Ruoyuan & Liu, Wenhe & Qi, Yuan, 2024. "Controlling shareholder's equity pledge and corporate financialization," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    7. Wang, Mingwei & Zhang, Junping & Liang, Decui, 2024. "Multi-period share pledging with sequential three-way proportion decision," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    8. Li, Shengnan & Zheng, Xinya & Niu, Jianbo & Ma, Xuan, 2024. "Share pledging of controlling shareholders and corporate social responsibility disclosure," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PA).
    9. Zili Su & Constantinos Alexiou, 2023. "Impact of share pledging by controlling shareholders on firm value in the context of China's tightened regulatory reforms," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(S2), pages 2847-2874, June.
    10. Hedy Jiaying Huang & Ahsan Habib & Sophia Li Sun & Ying Liu & Huiting Guo, 2021. "Financial reporting and corporate innovation: a review of the international literature," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(4), pages 5439-5499, December.
    11. He, Mingfeng & Huang, Dengshi & Zhou, Jianan, 2023. "The impacts of share pledging on firm investment timing and valuation," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).

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