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White certificates — Energy efficiency programs under private information of consumers

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  • Wirl, Franz

Abstract

Energy efficiency is an objective of public interventions at least since the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA). Recently, conservation has received considerable attention in the United States and in particular in the European Union but this time in order to mitigate global warming. Policy measures include regulations at the technical level and the introduction of white certificates in order to force utilities and firms to invest into conservation in a way similar to the already existing renewable energy quota. This paper derives the optimal mechanism if utilities must deal with white certificates facing consumers holding private information. The optimal mechanism has some theoretically interesting features like restricted participation and a discontinuity.

Suggested Citation

  • Wirl, Franz, 2015. "White certificates — Energy efficiency programs under private information of consumers," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 507-515.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:49:y:2015:i:c:p:507-515
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.03.026
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    Cited by:

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    2. Amundsen, Eirik Schrøder & Bye, Torstein, 2016. "Simultaneous use of black, green, and white certificates systems: A rather messy business," Working Papers in Economics 06/16, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    3. Fleckinger, Pierre & Glachant, Matthieu & Tamokoué Kamga, Paul-Hervé, 2019. "Energy Performance Certificates and investments in building energy efficiency: A theoretical analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(S1).
    4. Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet & Matthieu Glachant & Jean-Philippe Nicolai, 2020. "Selling and Saving Energy: Energy Efficiency Obligations in Liberalized Energy Markets," The Energy Journal, , vol. 41(1_suppl), pages 191-214, June.
    5. Crampes, Claude & Léautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2020. "White certificates and competition," TSE Working Papers 20-1167, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Eirik S. Amundsen & Torstein Bye, 2016. "Simultaneous use of black, green, and white certificates systems: A rather messy business," IFRO Working Paper 2016/03, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    7. Safarzadeh, Soroush & Hafezalkotob, Ashkan & Jafari, Hamed, 2022. "Energy supply chain empowerment through tradable green and white certificates: A pathway to sustainable energy generation," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 323(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conservation programs; White certificates; Incentives; Mechanism design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
    • Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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