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Environmental regulations implemented by local officials in China: Is there a hometown effect?

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  • Ma, Hongqi
  • Zou, Jingxian
  • Qin, Cong

Abstract

The emotional connection of the people-hometown relationship is an informal but important mechanism in environmental regulation. Based on firm-level Pollution Database in China, this study explores the impacts and mechanisms of the emotional connection between local officials and their hometowns in the implementation of environmental regulation. We found that (1) in the implementation of environmental regulation, the presence of native local officials (i.e., those serving in their home province) leads to a significant reduction in the exhaust gas emissions of industrial enterprises within their jurisdiction, which we call the “hometown effect” of local officials in environmental regulation; (2) Mechanism analysis shows that native local officials enforce stricter environmental regulations, manifested in reduced approval for the entry of polluting firms and less land transfer for developing key polluting industries. Simultaneously, firms are observed with remarkable improvements in their environmental protection technologies, with advancements in pre-emission reduction technology, post-treatment technology, and post-treatment efficiency within the jurisdiction of native local officials; (3) The trade-off between local environment quality and economic growth can be explained within the framework of local accountability. Additionally, the study reveals that the “hometown effect” of local officials in pollution control becomes larger in regions with a richer cultural and natural environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Ma, Hongqi & Zou, Jingxian & Qin, Cong, 2024. "Environmental regulations implemented by local officials in China: Is there a hometown effect?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:130:y:2024:i:c:s0140988324000483
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107340
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental regulation; Local officials; Hometown effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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