IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v269y2018i1p206-217.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A differential oligopoly game for optimal production planning and water savings

Author

Listed:
  • Xin, Baogui
  • Sun, Minghe

Abstract

A production planning single-decision problem is extended to a production planning and water saving dual-decision problem. A differential oligopoly game in which product prices are sticky and water right trading occurs is used to study this problem. Unlike previous studies appeared in the literature, the decisions in this study are affected simultaneously by both the product and the water right prices. Static, open-loop, closed-loop and feedback equilibria are analyzed to show optimal production plans and water saving decisions. The impact of oligopoly competition on the social welfare is finally analyzed. Different optimal solutions as the values of the parameters change are also simulated numerically. The results show that the firms’ optimal production plans and water saving decisions are strongly influenced by the water efficiency, initial water right allocations and water right reservation prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Xin, Baogui & Sun, Minghe, 2018. "A differential oligopoly game for optimal production planning and water savings," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 269(1), pages 206-217.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:269:y:2018:i:1:p:206-217
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.07.016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221717306434
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.07.016?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hasnas, Irina & Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2014. "Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 79-87.
    2. Guido Candela & Roberto Cellini, 2006. "Investment in Tourism Market: A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(1), pages 41-58, September.
    3. Piga, Claudio A. G., 2000. "Competition in a duopoly with sticky price and advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 595-614, May.
    4. Lambertini, Luca, 2005. "Advertising in a dynamic spatial monopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 166(2), pages 547-556, October.
    5. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca, 2007. "A differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods and sticky prices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(2), pages 1131-1144, January.
    6. Bertinelli, Luisito & Camacho, Carmen & Zou, Benteng, 2014. "Carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution: A differential game approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(2), pages 721-728.
    7. Feichtinger, Gustav & Lambertini, Luca & Leitmann, George & Wrzaczek, Stefan, 2016. "R&D for green technologies in a dynamic oligopoly: Schumpeter, arrow and inverted-U’s," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 249(3), pages 1131-1138.
    8. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-1164, September.
    9. Driskill, Robert A. & McCafferty, Stephen, 1989. "Dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs: A differential game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 324-338, December.
    10. Krishnamoorthy, Anand & Prasad, Ashutosh & Sethi, Suresh P., 2010. "Optimal pricing and advertising in a durable-good duopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 200(2), pages 486-497, January.
    11. Fruchter, Gila E. & Messinger, Paul R., 2003. "Optimal management of fringe entry over time," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 445-466, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wei Peng & Baogui Xin & Yekyung Kwon, 2019. "Optimal Strategies of Product Price, Quality, and Corporate Environmental Responsibility," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(23), pages 1-24, November.
    2. Rongrong Xu & Yongxiang Wu & Ming Chen & Xuan Zhang & Wei Wu & Long Tan & Gaoxu Wang & Yi Xu & Bing Yan & Yuedong Xia, 2019. "Calculation of the contribution rate of China’s hydraulic science and technology based on a feedforward neural network," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(9), pages 1-22, September.
    3. Peng, Wei & Xin, Baogui & Xie, Lei, 2023. "Optimal strategies for production plan and carbon emission reduction in a hydrogen supply chain under cap-and-trade policy," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    4. Wang, Xinyu & Zhang, Yuxing & Zhang, Shuhua, 2024. "Dynamic order allocation in a duopoly hybrid workforce of competition: A machine learning approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 315(2), pages 668-690.
    5. Wu, Cheng-Han, 2019. "Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(3), pages 840-853.
    6. Liu, Jiaguo & Zhao, Huida & Li, Jian & Yue, Xiaohang, 2021. "Operational strategy of customized bus considering customers’ variety seeking behavior and service level," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    7. Ma, Shigui & He, Yong & Gu, Ran & Yeh, Chung-Hsing, 2024. "How to cooperate in a three-tier food delivery service supply chain," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    8. Gong, Qingbin & Yang, Zhe, 2022. "Differential quantum duopoly games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 598(C).
    9. Junwu Wang & Yinghui Song & Mao Li & Cong Yuan & Feng Guo, 2022. "Study on Low-Carbon Technology Innovation Strategies through Government–University–Enterprise Cooperation under Carbon Trading Policy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-26, July.
    10. Valentini, Edilio & Vitale, Paolo, 2019. "Uncertainty and Risk-aversion in a Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications 285025, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    11. Chan, Chi Kin & Zhou, Yan & Wong, Kar Hung, 2018. "A dynamic equilibrium model of the oligopolistic closed-loop supply chain network under uncertain and time-dependent demands," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 325-354.
    12. Baogui Xin & Wei Peng & Minghe Sun, 2019. "Optimal Coordination Strategy for International Production Planning and Pollution Abating under Cap-and-Trade Regulations," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(18), pages 1-21, September.
    13. Esfahani, Hamideh, 2019. "Profitability of horizontal mergers in the presence of price stickiness," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(3), pages 941-950.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Huang, Jian & Leng, Mingming & Liang, Liping, 2012. "Recent developments in dynamic advertising research," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(3), pages 591-609.
    2. Wu, Cheng-Han, 2019. "Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(3), pages 840-853.
    3. G. Bertuzzi & L. Lambertini, 2001. "Advertising in a Differential Game of Spatial Competition," Working Papers 400, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    4. Santiago J. Rubio, 2002. "On The Coincidence Of The Feedback Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria In Economic Applications Of Differential Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca, 2007. "A differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods and sticky prices," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 176(2), pages 1131-1144, January.
    6. Lu, Fuxiao & Tang, Wansheng & Liu, Guowei & Zhang, Jianxiong, 2019. "Cooperative advertising: A way escaping from the prisoner’s dilemma in a supply chain with sticky price," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 87-106.
    7. Vernasca, Gianluigi, 2003. "Dynamic Price Competition With Price Adjustment Costs And Product Differentiation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 681, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    8. Katarzyna Kańska & Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2022. "Dynamic Stackelberg duopoly with sticky prices and a myopic follower," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 4221-4252, September.
    9. Kogan, Konstantin, 2016. "Pricing competition with inventory considerations in a hazard rate-prone market of durables," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 298-313.
    10. Wu, Cheng-Han, 2018. "Price competition and technology licensing in a dynamic duopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 267(2), pages 570-584.
    11. Liu, Yang & Zhang, Jianxiong & Zhang, Shichen & Liu, Guowei, 2017. "Prisoner’s dilemma on behavioral choices in the presence of sticky prices: Farsightedness vs. myopia," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 128-142.
    12. Fan Zhang & Susu Cheng, 2021. "Behavioral choices in a dynamic duopoly with process innovation and sticky price: Myopia versus farsightedness," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(3), pages 662-674, April.
    13. Esfahani, Hamideh, 2019. "Profitability of horizontal mergers in the presence of price stickiness," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(3), pages 941-950.
    14. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2002. "Advertising with Spillover Effects in a Differential Oligopoly Game With Differentiated Goods," Working Papers 430, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    15. Vernasca, Gianluigi, 2003. "Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation," Economic Research Papers 269565, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    16. Edilio Valentini & Paolo Vitale, 2022. "A Dynamic Oligopoly with Price Stickiness and Risk-Averse Agents," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 8(3), pages 697-718, November.
    17. Gianluigi Vernasca, 2003. "Dynamic Price Competition with Price Adjustment Costs and Product Differentiation," Working Papers 2003.120, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    18. Wu, Cheng-Han, 2021. "A dynamic perspective of government intervention in a competitive closed-loop supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 294(1), pages 122-137.
    19. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop,Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions," Working Papers 393, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    20. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2019. "General analysis of dynamic oligopoly with sticky price," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2990-2998.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:269:y:2018:i:1:p:206-217. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.