IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v254y2016i1p294-303.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Sustaining cooperation in a differential game of advertising goodwill accumulation

Author

Listed:
  • Jørgensen, Steffen
  • Gromova, Ekaterina

Abstract

The paper suggests a differential game of advertising competition among three symmetric firms, played over an infinite horizon. The objective of the research is to see if a cooperative agreement among the firms can be sustained over time. For this purpose the paper determines the characteristic functions (value functions) of individual players and all possible coalitions. We identify an imputation that belongs to the core. Using this imputation guarantees that, in any subgame starting out on the cooperative state trajectory, no coalition has an incentive to deviate from what was prescribed by the solution of the grand coalition’s optimization problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Jørgensen, Steffen & Gromova, Ekaterina, 2016. "Sustaining cooperation in a differential game of advertising goodwill accumulation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 254(1), pages 294-303.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:254:y:2016:i:1:p:294-303
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.03.029
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221716301576
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.03.029?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lin, Xuxun & Wang, Haiyan, 2022. "Dynamic pricing for online information services considering service duration and quality level," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    2. Parilina, Elena M. & Zaccour, Georges, 2024. "Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games played over event trees," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1200-1216.
    3. Mario A. García-Meza & Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova & José Daniel López-Barrientos, 2018. "Stable Marketing Cooperation in a Differential Game for an Oligopoly," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-18, September.
    4. Jian Feng & Bin Liu, 2018. "Dynamic Impact of Online Word-of-Mouth and Advertising on Supply Chain Performance," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-16, January.
    5. Fangju Jia & Dong‐dong Wang & Kun Zhou & Lianshui Li, 2022. "Differential decision analysis of transboundary pollution considering the participation of the central government," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 1684-1703, September.
    6. Guan, Zhimin & Ye, Tong & Yin, Rui, 2020. "Channel coordination under Nash bargaining fairness concerns in differential games of goodwill accumulation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 285(3), pages 916-930.
    7. Dmitry Gromov & Ekaterina Gromova, 2017. "On a Class of Hybrid Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 266-288, June.
    8. Susu Cheng & Fan Zhang, 2022. "Regulatory pressure and consumer environmental awareness in a green supply chain with retailer responsibility: A dynamic analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(4), pages 1133-1151, June.
    9. Yuntao Bai & Qiang Wang & Yueling Yang, 2022. "From Pollution Control Cooperation of Lancang-Mekong River to “Two Mountains Theory”," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-24, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:254:y:2016:i:1:p:294-303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.