The policy of deregulation in The Netherlands
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- George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
- Levine, Michael E & Forrence, Jennifer L, 1990. "Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 167-198.
- Noll, Roger G., 1989. "Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1253-1287, Elsevier.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1976.
"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
- Sam Peltzman, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," NBER Working Papers 0133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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- J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
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