The Belmont-Morgan Syndicate as an optimal investment banking contract
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Cited by:
- Barry Eichengreen., 1993.
"International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers
C93-021, University of California at Berkeley.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233202, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
- Pierre-Richard Agénor & Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Robert P. Flood, 1992.
"Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance of Payments Crises,"
IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(2), pages 357-394, June.
- Mr. Robert P Flood & Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Pierre-Richard Agénor, 1991. "Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance of Payments Crises," IMF Working Papers 1991/099, International Monetary Fund.
- Pierre-Richard Agenor & Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Robert P. Flood, 1991. "Speculative Attacks and Models of Balance-of-Payments Crises," NBER Working Papers 3919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barry Eichengreen, 1998.
"Exchange Rate Stability and Financial Stability,"
Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 569-608, January.
- Barry Eichengreen., 1997. "Exchange Rate Stability and Financial Stability," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-092, University of California at Berkeley.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 1997. "Exchange Rate Stability and Financial Stability," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233612, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
- Barry Eichengreen., 1994.
"Deja Vu All Over Again: Lessons from the Gold Standard for European Monetary Unification,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers
C94-032, University of California at Berkeley.
- Eichengreen, Barry, 1994. "Deja Vu All Over Again: Lessons from the Gold Standard for European Monetary Unification," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233215, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
- Charles W. Calomiris, 1992. "Greenback Resumption and Silver Risk: The Economics and Politics of Monetary Regime Change in the United States, 1862-1900," NBER Working Papers 4166, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael D. Bordo & Finn E. Kydland, 1990.
"The Gold Standard as a Rule,"
NBER Working Papers
3367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael D. Bordo & Finn E. Kydland, 1992. "The gold standard as a rule," Working Papers (Old Series) 9205, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Alberto Giovannini, 1993. "Bretton Woods and Its Precursors: Rules versus Discretion in the History of International Monetary Regimes," NBER Chapters, in: A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, pages 109-154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael D. Bordo, 1989.
"The Contribution of "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960" to Monetary History,"
NBER Chapters, in: Money, History, and International Finance: Essays in Honor of Anna J. Schwartz, pages 15-78,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael D. Bordo, 1988. "The Contribution of a Monetary History of the United States: 1867 to 1960 To Monetary History," NBER Working Papers 2549, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James D. Hamilton, 1988. "Role Of The International Gold Standard In Propagating The Great Depression," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(2), pages 67-89, April.
- George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2015.
"A History of U.S. Debt Limits,"
NBER Working Papers
21799, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- George J. Hall & Thomas J. Sargent, 2015. "A History of U.S. Debt Limits," Working Papers 98, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School.
- Michael Bordo & Anna Schwartz, 1996.
"Why clashes between internal and external stability goals end in currency crises, 1797–1994,"
Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 437-468, March.
- Michael D. Bordo & Anna J. Schwartz, 1996. "Why Clashes Between Internal and External Stability Goals End in Currency Crises, 1797-1994," NBER Working Papers 5710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vittorio Grilli, 1989. "Managing Exchange Rate Crises: Evidence from the 1890's," NBER Working Papers 3068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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