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Uncertain policy promises

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  • Haberis, Alex
  • Harrison, Richard
  • Waldron, Matt

Abstract

We develop a general method for analyzing the effects of macroeconomic policy promises about which the private sector is uncertain. We illustrate the method in two applications to a central bank’s ‘forward guidance’ about the path for its policy rate. We demonstrate that uncertainty about forward guidance resulting from its potential to be imperfectly credible makes it much less powerful than in textbook models. In an application to the FOMC’s ‘threshold-based’ guidance, we show that increasing the precision of the conditions under which the policy rate ‘lifts off’ from the zero bound requires a lower unemployment threshold to deliver a given amount of stimulus.

Suggested Citation

  • Haberis, Alex & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2019. "Uncertain policy promises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 459-474.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:111:y:2019:i:c:p:459-474
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Günter Coenen & Carlos Montes‐Galdón & Frank Smets, 2023. "Effects of State‐Dependent Forward Guidance, Large‐Scale Asset Purchases, and Fiscal Stimulus in a Low‐Interest‐Rate Environment," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 825-858, June.
    2. Julien Albertini & Valentin Jouvanceau & Stéphane Moyen, 2022. "State-Contingent Forward Guidance," Working Papers 2205, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    3. Budianto, Flora & Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2023. "Average inflation targeting and the interest rate lower bound," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    4. de Groot, Oliver & Mazelis, Falk & Motto, Roberto & Ristiniemi, Annukka, 2021. "A toolkit for computing Constrained Optimal Policy Projections (COPPs)," Working Paper Series 2555, European Central Bank.
    5. Hatcher, Michael, 2022. "Solving linear rational expectations models in the presence of structural change: Some extensions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    6. Cecion, Martina & Coenen, Günter & Gerke, Rafael & Le Bihan, Hervé & Motto, Roberto & Aguilar, Pablo & Ajevskis, Viktors & Giesen, Sebastian & Albertazzi, Ugo & Gilbert, Niels & Al-Haschimi, Alexander, 2021. "The ECB’s price stability framework: past experience, and current and future challenges," Occasional Paper Series 269, European Central Bank.
    7. Christopher Gibbs & Nigel McClung, 2023. "Does my model predict a forward guidance puzzle?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 393-423, December.
    8. Stephen J. Cole & Enrique Martínez García & Eric Sims, 2023. "Living Up to Expectations: Central Bank Credibility, the Effectiveness of Forward Guidance and Inflation Dynamics Post-Global Financial Crisis," Globalization Institute Working Papers 424, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    9. Christopher Gibbs & Nigel McClung, 2023. "Does my model predict a forward guidance puzzle?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 393-423, December.
    10. Gibbs, Christopher G. & McClung, Nigel, 2019. "Does my model predict a forward guidance puzzle?," Research Discussion Papers 19/2019, Bank of Finland.
    11. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2019_019 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Eskelinen, Maria & Gibbs, Christopher G. & McClung, Nigel, 2024. "Resolving new keynesian puzzles," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 5/2024, Bank of Finland.
    13. Ida, Daisuke & Iiboshi, Hirokuni, 2021. "The interaction of forward guidance in a two-country new Keynesian model," MPRA Paper 106752, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2021. "Optimal policy with occasionally binding constraints: piecewise linear solution methods," Bank of England working papers 911, Bank of England.
    15. Bonciani, Dario & Oh, Joonseok, 2021. "Optimal monetary policy mix at the zero lower bound," Bank of England working papers 945, Bank of England.
    16. repec:zbw:bofrdp:019 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Prasanna Gai & Cameron Haworth, 2024. "Alternative Monetary Policy Commitments and the Yield Curve," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 100(329), pages 137-159, June.
    18. Daisuke Ida & Hirokuni Iiboshi, 2021. "The international forward guidance transmission under a global liquidity trap," Papers 2103.12503, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imperfect credibility; Forward guidance; Discretion; Uncertainty; Zero lower bound;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E20 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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