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Some implications of the unofficial economy-bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries

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  • Cule, Monika
  • Fulton, Murray

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  • Cule, Monika & Fulton, Murray, 2005. "Some implications of the unofficial economy-bureaucratic corruption relationship in transition countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 207-211, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:89:y:2005:i:2:p:207-211
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 2000. "Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 495-520, June.
    2. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis, 1992. "Corruption in tax administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 333-349, December.
    5. Casson, Mark, 1991. "The Economics of Business Culture: Game Theory, Transaction Costs, and Economic Performance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283751.
    6. Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2000. "Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 459-493, June.
    7. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fang Huang & John Rice, 2012. "Firm Networking and Bribery in China: Assessing Some Potential Negative Consequences of Firm Openness," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 107(4), pages 533-545, June.
    2. Çule, Monika & Fulton, Murray, 2009. "Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 811-822, December.
    3. Suslov, N. & Mel'tenisova, E., 2015. "Analysis of Energy Price's Impact on Shadow Economies Around the World," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 12-43.
    4. Infante, Davide & Smirnova, Janna, 2009. "Rent-seeking under a weak institutional environment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 118-121, September.
    5. repec:eid:wpaper:13/10 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Andrew Samuel & Amy Farmer & Fabio Mendez, 2020. "Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits, tickets, or both?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 67(4), pages 420-441, September.
    7. James E. Foster & Andrew W. Horowitz & Fabio Méndez, 2012. "An Axiomatic Approach to the Measurement of Corruption: Theory and Applications," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 26(2), pages 217-235.
    8. Ajit Mishra & R Ray, 2010. "Informality, Corruption, and Inequality," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/10, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    9. Alm, James & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McClellan, Chandler, 2016. "Corruption and firm tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 146-163.
    10. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    11. Leiva, Benjamin, 2020. "Natural resource rent allocation, government quality, and concession design: The case of copper in Chile," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    12. James E. Payne & James W. Saunoris, 2020. "Corruption and Firm Tax Evasion in Transition Economies: Results from Censored Quantile Instrumental Variables Estimation," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 48(2), pages 195-206, June.
    13. Lim, King Yoong, 2019. "Modelling the dynamics of corruption and unemployment with heterogeneous labour," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 98-117.
    14. Fabio Méndez, 2014. "Can corruption foster regulatory compliance?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 189-207, January.
    15. Ari Kokko & Victoria Kravtsova, 2012. "Regional Characteristics And Effects Of Inward Fdi: The Case Of Ukraine," Organizations and Markets in Emerging Economies, Faculty of Economics, Vilnius University, vol. 3(2).

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