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Multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias

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  • Kobayashi, Teruyoshi

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  • Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2003. "Multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 317-321, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:80:y:2003:i:3:p:317-321
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Jensen, Henrik, 1998. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 384-403, August.
    2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    3. repec:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:3:p:463-70 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Lawler, Phillip, 2002. "Monetary uncertainty, strategic wage setting and equilibrium employment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 35-40, September.
    5. Schellekens, Philip, 2002. "Caution and Conservatism in the Making of Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(1), pages 160-177, February.
    6. S[empty]rensen, Jan Rose, 1991. "Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 377-381, December.
    7. repec:bla:scandj:v:96:y:1994:i:1:p:125-31 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Muscatelli, Anton, 1998. "Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability through Independence?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 529-542, March.
    9. Pearce, Douglas K. & Sobue, Motoshi, 1997. "Uncertainty and the inflation bias of monetary policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 203-207, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olga S. Kuznetsova & Sergey A. Merzlyakov, 2015. "The Role of Uncertain Government Preferences For Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction," HSE Working papers WP BRP 102/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
    3. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2008. "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," Working Papers in Public Economics 115, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    4. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2005. "A model of monetary unification under asymmetric information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15.
    5. Meixing Dai & Qiao Zhang, 2013. "Central bank transparency with the cost channel," Working Papers of BETA 2013-06, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos, 2017. "How multiplicative uncertainty affects the tradeoff between information disclosure and stabilisation policy?," Working Papers of BETA 2017-15, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    7. Ciccarone, Giuseppe & Marchetti, Enrico, 2009. "Revisiting the role of multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 37-39, July.
    8. Meixing Dai, 2010. "Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 1720-1726.
    9. Ciccarone, Giuseppe & Giuli, Francesco & Marchetti, Enrico, 2019. "Macroeconomic equilibrium and nominal price rigidities under imperfect rationality," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 60-78.

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