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Real supply shocks and the money growth-inflation relationship

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  • Christensen, Michael

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  • Christensen, Michael, 2001. "Real supply shocks and the money growth-inflation relationship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 67-72, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:72:y:2001:i:1:p:67-72
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    1. Swanson, Norman R., 1998. "Money and output viewed through a rolling window," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 455-474, May.
    2. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Cochrane, John H., 1998. "What do the VARs mean? Measuring the output effects of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 277-300, April.
    5. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
    6. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    7. Eric M. Leeper & Christopher A. Sims & Tao Zha, 1996. "What Does Monetary Policy Do?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 27(2), pages 1-78.
    8. Pearce, Douglas K. & Sobue, Motoshi, 1997. "Uncertainty and the inflation bias of monetary policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 203-207, December.
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    1. Naveen Srinivasan & Vidya Mahambare & M. Ramachandran, 2006. "Modelling Inflation in India: A Critique of the Structuralist Approach," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 4(2), pages 45-58, July.
    2. Hisali, Eria, 2010. "Fiscal policy consistency and implications for macroeconomic aggregates: the case of Uganda," Research Reports 102489, Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC).
    3. Murdipi, Rafiqa & Law, Siong Hook, 2016. "Dynamic Linkages between Price Indices and Inflation in Malaysia," Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, vol. 50(1), pages 41-52.
    4. Jiang, Chun & Chang, Tsangyao & Li, Xiao-Lin, 2015. "Money growth and inflation in China: New evidence from a wavelet analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 249-261.
    5. Todorović, Jadranka Đurović & Tomić, Zoran & Denić, Nebojša & Petković, Dalibor & Kojić, Nenad & Petrović, Jelena & Petković, Biljana, 2018. "Applicability of Newton’s law of cooling in monetary economics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 494(C), pages 209-217.
    6. Ge, Zhenyu & Sun, Yang, 2024. "Asymmetric impact of oil price shocks on inflation: Evidence from quantile-on-quantile regression," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    7. Babu RAO G., 2020. "Impact of exchange rate regimes on inflation: An empirical analysis of BRICS countries," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(2(623), S), pages 215-224, Summer.

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