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Market foreclosure without vertical integration

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  • Hardt, Michael

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  • Hardt, Michael, 1995. "Market foreclosure without vertical integration," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(3-4), pages 423-429, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:47:y:1995:i:3-4:p:423-429
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 205-286.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    4. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    5. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wey, Christian & Inderst, Roman, 2005. "How Strong Buyers Spur Upstream Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5365, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Isabel Teichmann & Vanessa von Schlippenbach, 2014. "Collusive Effects of a Monopolist's Use of an Intermediary to Deliver to Retailers," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1440, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Pedro Mendi, 2005. "Vertical Integration, Collusion Downstream, and Partial Market Foreclosure," Faculty Working Papers 17/05, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.

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