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Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk

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  • Zou, Liang

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  • Zou, Liang, 1995. "Incentive contracting with hidden choices of effort and risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(3-4), pages 311-316, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:47:y:1995:i:3-4:p:311-316
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diamond, Peter A. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1974. "Increases in risk and in risk aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 337-360, July.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
    4. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    5. Haugen, Robert A & Senbet, Lemma W, 1981. "Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital through Options," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(3), pages 629-647, June.
    6. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    7. Williams, Joseph T, 1987. "Perquisites, Risk, and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(1), pages 29-48, March.
    8. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Pandey, Priyanka, 2000. "Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 303-326, December.
    2. Zou, Liang & Sun, Laixiang, 2000. "Liability Sharing as a Mechanism to Improve Firms' Investment and Liquidation Decisions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 739-761, December.

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