IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v30y1989i3p195-200.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority

Author

Listed:
  • Harrington, Joseph Jr.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 195-200, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:30:y:1989:i:3:p:195-200
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0165-1765(89)90225-5
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julio Dávila & Jan Eeckhout & César Martinelli, 2009. "Bargaining over Public Goods," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(6), pages 927-945, December.
    2. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
    3. Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2009. "Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 851-868, March.
    4. Malte Braack & Christian Henning & Johannes Ziesmer, 2024. "Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 373-421, June.
    5. Evdokimov, Kirill S., 2020. "Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    6. James M. Snyder Jr. & Michael M. Ting & Stephen Ansolabehere, 2005. "Legislative Bargaining under Weighted Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 981-1004, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:30:y:1989:i:3:p:195-200. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.