IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v143y2016icp61-65.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Non-competition covenants in acquisition deals

Author

Listed:
  • Azevedo, Alcino
  • Pereira, Paulo J.
  • Rodrigues, Artur

Abstract

We study the changes in the consumers’ and producers’ surplus associated with acquisition deals where there is a non-competition covenant that forbids the seller from re-entering the market over a given time period. We find that these acquisition deals can lead to significant negative (positive) changes in the producers’ (consumers’) surplus, which decrease significantly with the time period of the covenant. We also show that the effect of the time period of the covenant on the welfare change can be positive or negative. It depends largely on the market conditions, such as the profit uncertainty and growth rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Azevedo, Alcino & Pereira, Paulo J. & Rodrigues, Artur, 2016. "Non-competition covenants in acquisition deals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 61-65.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:143:y:2016:i:c:p:61-65
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.025
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516300970
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.025?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ferreira, Ricardo M. & Pereira, Paulo J., 2021. "A dynamic model for venture capitalists’ entry–exit investment decisions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(2), pages 779-789.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-competition covenants; Acquisitions; Real options;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:143:y:2016:i:c:p:61-65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.