IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v12y1983i1p81-87.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information

Author

Listed:
  • Cooper, Russell

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Cooper, Russell, 1983. "A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 81-87.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:12:y:1983:i:1:p:81-87
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0165-1765(83)90116-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cardoso, Renato Fragelli, 1997. "Entrepreneurial risk and labor's share in output," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 51(2), April.
    2. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Theories of Wage Rigidity," NBER Working Papers 1442, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Marco de Pinto & Jörg Lingens, 2019. "Unionization, information asymmetry and the de‐location of firms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(4), pages 1782-1823, November.
    4. Russell Cooper, 1983. "Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 671R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 1984.
    5. Ed Nosal & Richard Rogerson & Randall Wright, 1991. "A note on labor contracts with private information and household production," Staff Report 131, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    6. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Anne C. Sibert, 1984. "The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information," International Finance Discussion Papers 248, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:12:y:1983:i:1:p:81-87. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.