On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.013
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2010. "Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(3), pages 453-467, December.
- Donald Campbell & Jerry Kelly, 2014. "Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 329-355, August.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- László Kóczy & Alexandru Nichifor, 2013.
"The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 863-884, April.
- László Á. Kóczy & Alexandru Nichifor, 2012. "The Intellectual Influence of Economic Journals: Quality versus Quantity," Working Paper Series 1202, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Koczy, L. & Nichifor, A., 2012. "The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Laszlo A. Koczy & Alexandru Nichifor, 2012. "The Intellectual Influence of Economic Journals: Quality versus Quantity," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1215, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
- Christian Klamler, 2014. "How risky is it to manipulate a scoring rule under incomplete information?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 1214-1221.
More about this item
Keywords
Social choice functions; Manipulations; Gains; Losses;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:229-232. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.