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Protectionism during the crisis: Tit-for-tat or chicken-games?

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  • Boffa, Mauro
  • Olarreaga, Marcelo

Abstract

We explore the extent to which the adoption of protectionist measures during the recent financial crisis led to retaliation by trading partners. We find no evidence of retaliation. On the contrary, there is strong evidence of chicken-games being played.

Suggested Citation

  • Boffa, Mauro & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2012. "Protectionism during the crisis: Tit-for-tat or chicken-games?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 746-749.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:746-749
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.042
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Giovanni Maggi & Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, 2007. "A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1374-1406, September.
    2. A. Colin Cameron & Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, 2011. "Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 238-249, April.
    3. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    4. Douglas A. Irwin, 1998. "The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(2), pages 326-334, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nathalie Etchart-Vincent, 2013. "Wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken. An explorative experimental study," Working Papers hal-00796708, HAL.
    2. Furceri, Davide & Ostry, Jonathan D. & Papageorgiou, Chris & Wibaux, Pauline, 2021. "Retaliatory temporary trade barriers: New facts and patterns," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 873-891.
    3. Furceri, Davide & Ostry, Jonathan D. & Papageorgiou, Chris & Wibaux, Pauline, 2023. "Retaliation through Temporary Trade Barriers," CEPR Discussion Papers 17853, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Grundke, Robert & Moser, Christoph, 2019. "Hidden protectionism? Evidence from non-tariff barriers to trade in the United States," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 143-157.
    5. Georgios Georgiadis & Johannes Gräb, 2016. "Growth, Real Exchange Rates and Trade Protectionism since the Financial Crisis," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 1050-1080, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade retaliation; Chicken-games; Financial crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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