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Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games

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  • Bahel, Eric

Abstract

The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the rock–paper–scissors game is proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Bahel, Eric, 2012. "Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 401-403.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:401-403
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.098
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:43:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Anne van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-6.
    3. A. van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1003, The University of Melbourne.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ɖura-Georg Granić & Johannes Kern, 2016. "Circulant games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 43-69, January.
    2. Bahel, Eric & Haller, Hans, 2013. "Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended Rock–Paper–Scissors games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 588-591.

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    1. Bahel, Eric & Haller, Hans, 2013. "Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended Rock–Paper–Scissors games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 588-591.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cycle; Nash equilibrium; Prudent strategy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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