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Ranking of signals in multitask agency models

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  • Xie, Jia

Abstract

A lift zonoid criterion is proven to be necessary and sufficient for ranking signals in multi-task agency models, and can be applied to a broader set of signals than a multivariate MPS criterion. The two criteria coincide under certain conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Xie, Jia, 2011. "Ranking of signals in multitask agency models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 82-84, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:82-84
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-1367, November.
    2. Page, Frank Jr., 1987. "The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 157-167, April.
    3. Claude Fluet & Dominique Demougin, 2001. "Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(2), pages 489-496.
    4. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jia Xie, 2015. "Information, Risk Sharing and Incentives in Agency Problems," Staff Working Papers 15-7, Bank of Canada.
    2. Jia Xie, 2017. "Information, Risk Sharing, And Incentives In Agency Problems," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(1), pages 157-182, February.

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