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A characterization of the Copeland solution

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  • Sanver, M. Remzi
  • Selçuk, Özer

Abstract

We show that the Copeland solution is equivalent to the minisum principle which requires to choose the candidate(s) who beat all remaining contenders in the smallest total number of steps.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanver, M. Remzi & Selçuk, Özer, 2010. "A characterization of the Copeland solution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 354-355, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:3:p:354-355
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
    2. Satya Paul, 1997. "The quality of life: an international comparison based on ordinal measures," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(7), pages 411-414.
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    Cited by:

    1. Susumu Cato, 2015. "Conditions on social-preference cycles," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(1), pages 1-13, July.

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    Keywords

    Tournament Copeland Minisum;

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