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A note on optimal paternalism and health capital subsidies

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  • Aronsson, Thomas
  • Thunström, Linda

Abstract

This paper concerns the policy implications of a potential self-control problem underlying the consumption of unhealthy food. Our results show that subsidies on wealth and health capital can be used to implement a socially optimal resource allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Aronsson, Thomas & Thunström, Linda, 2008. "A note on optimal paternalism and health capital subsidies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 241-242, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:3:p:241-242
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matthew Rabin & Ted O'Donoghue, 1999. "Doing It Now or Later," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 103-124, March.
    2. O'Donoghue, Ted & Rabin, Matthew, 2006. "Optimal sin taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1825-1849, November.
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    7. repec:bla:scandj:v:98:y:1996:i:2:p:185-201 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
    9. David I. Laibson, 1996. "Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy," NBER Working Papers 5635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Schnellenbach, Jan, 2012. "Nudges and norms: On the political economy of soft paternalism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 266-277.
    2. Aronsson, Thomas & Granlund, David, 2011. "Public goods and optimal paternalism under present-biased preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 54-57, October.
    3. Chu-chuan Cheng & Hsun Chu, 2018. "Optimal policies for sin goods and health care: Tax or subsidy?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(2), pages 412-429, April.
    4. Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2014. "Tax policy and present-biased preferences: Paternalism under international capital mobility," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 298-316.
    5. Justina Klimaviciute, 2024. "(No) time to be healthy: Optimal policy with time and monetary investments in health," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(3), pages 410-431, March.
    6. Aronsson, Thomas & Granlund, David, 2010. "Present-Biased Preferences and Publicly Provided Health Care," HUI Working Papers 41, HUI Research.
    7. Strulik, Holger & Werner, Katharina, 2021. "Time-inconsistent health behavior and its impact on aging and longevity," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    8. Kamila Danilowicz-Gösele & Robert Schwager, 2016. "Subsidizing Health-Conscious Behavior Now or Later," CESifo Working Paper Series 5734, CESifo.
    9. Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos, 2017. "Optimal Paternalistic Health and Human Capital Policies," Working Papers 1709, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    10. Thunström, Linda, 2009. "Consumer Values of Health-Related Food Symbols and Chemical Food Additives - The Case of Breakfast Cereals," HUI Working Papers 25, HUI Research.
    11. Thomas Aronsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2010. "An Optimal-Tax Approach to Alcohol Policy," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 66(2), pages 153-169, June.
    12. Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2016. "Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, paternalism and optimal mixed taxation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 24-36.
    13. repec:cup:judgdm:v:14:y:2019:i:1:p:11-25 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Linda Thunström, 2019. "Welfare effects of nudges: The emotional tax of calorie menu labeling," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 14(1), pages 11-25, January.
    15. Arbex, Marcelo & Mattos, Enlinson, 2019. "Optimal paternalistic health and human capital subsidy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 39-42.
    16. Aronsson, Thomas & Hetschko, Clemens & Schöb, Ronnie, 2020. "Globalization, Time-Preferences, and Populist Voting," Umeå Economic Studies 978, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    17. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2022. "Present bias and externalities: Can government intervention raise welfare?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1480-1506, August.
    18. Thomas Aronsson & David Granlund, 2014. "Present-Biased Preferences and Publicly Provided Private Goods," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(2), pages 169-199, June.
    19. Aronsson, Thomas & Granlund, David, 2010. "Public Goods and Optimal Paternalism under Present-Biased Preferences," HUI Working Papers 38, HUI Research.

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