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Investment and capital structure decisions with strategic debt service under asymmetric information

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  • Song, Dandan
  • Luo, Pengfei
  • Yang, Jingjing

Abstract

This paper examines the agency problem due to manager-shareholder conflicts in a real option framework by incorporating strategic debt service. We show that when the equityholders’ bargaining power is weak, the optimal coupon is larger and the manager overinvests the project relative to the case without renegotiation, while the results are totally opposite when the bargaining power is strong. An increase in equityholders’ bargaining power reduces the manager’s value and the total social value. Especially, the social value can be improved by debt renegotiation when the systematic risk is high, which provides an explanation why Chinese government encourage the market-oriented debt restructuring.

Suggested Citation

  • Song, Dandan & Luo, Pengfei & Yang, Jingjing, 2020. "Investment and capital structure decisions with strategic debt service under asymmetric information," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:54:y:2020:i:c:s1062940818304649
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2018.11.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Tan, Yingxian & Luo, Pengfei, 2021. "The impact of debt restructuring on dynamic investment and financing policies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Investment and capital structure; Strategic debt service; Manager-shareholder conflicts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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