IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecanpo/v85y2025icp943-962.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Encouraging or inhibiting: Can analyst attention reduce corporate greenwashing behavior?

Author

Listed:
  • Zhang, Mengzhi
  • He, Wenjian

Abstract

As an essential mechanism of corporate external governance, it is worth considering whether analyst attention can inhibit corporate greenwashing behavior. Based on the theoretical exploration of the mechanism of analyst attention on corporate greenwashing behavior, this paper, using the data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies, quantitatively finds that analyst attention does not inhibit but rather encourages corporate greenwashing. After a series of robustness tests, the baseline regression results remain consistent. The mechanism test reveals that analyst attention encourages greenwashing due to the information asymmetry, which creates short-term performance pressure. This pressure displaces investments in environmental governance, ultimately increasing the motivation for greenwashing, rather than being driven by collusion between the two parties. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that analyst attention contributes more significantly to corporate greenwashing behavior among non-state-owned firms and firms with a high shareholding ratio of short-term institutional investors. These findings offer valuable insights for developing analyst practices and promoting genuine corporate environmental responsibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Mengzhi & He, Wenjian, 2025. "Encouraging or inhibiting: Can analyst attention reduce corporate greenwashing behavior?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 943-962.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:85:y:2025:i:c:p:943-962
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2025.01.007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0313592625000049
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.eap.2025.01.007?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Analyst attention; Greenwashing; Short-term performance pressure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • P28 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Natural Resources; Environment

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:85:y:2025:i:c:p:943-962. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economic-analysis-and-policy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.