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Capacity constraints and voluntary output cutback in dynamic Cournot competition

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  • Tsutsui, Shunichi O.

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  • Tsutsui, Shunichi O., 1996. "Capacity constraints and voluntary output cutback in dynamic Cournot competition," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(9-10), pages 1683-1708.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:20:y:1996:i:9-10:p:1683-1708
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
    2. Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-1164, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wirl, Franz, 2010. "Dynamic demand and noncompetitive intertemporal output adjustments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 220-229, May.
    2. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2021. "A stochastic differential game of duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    3. Ihori, Toshihiro & Itaya, Jun-ichi, 2001. "A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 779-797, November.
    4. Rowat, Colin, 2007. "Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3179-3202, October.
    5. Santiago J. Rubio, 2002. "On The Coincidence Of The Feedback Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria In Economic Applications Of Differential Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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