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Cooperation under the shadow of political inequality

Author

Listed:
  • Rosokha, Yaroslav
  • Lyu, Xinxin
  • Tverskoi, Denis
  • Gavrilets, Sergey

Abstract

We study cooperation among individuals and groups facing a dynamic social dilemma in which the benefits of cooperation are divided according to political power obtained in a contest. The main theoretical and experimental results focus on the role of the incumbency advantage. Specifically, an incumbency advantage in the political contest leads to a rapid breakdown of cooperation in the social dilemma. In addition, we investigate whether groups behave differently than individuals and provide simulations based on the individual evolutionary learning model of Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) to shed light on the difference observed in the experiment.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosokha, Yaroslav & Lyu, Xinxin & Tverskoi, Denis & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2025. "Cooperation under the shadow of political inequality," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:172:y:2025:i:c:s0165188924001805
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104988
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic games; Cooperation; Coordination; Contest; Experiments; Group decision making;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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