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Financing green entrepreneurs under limited commitment

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  • Bensoussan, Alain
  • Chevalier-Roignant, Benoit
  • Nguyen, Nam
  • Rivera, Alejandro

Abstract

Risk-averse entrepreneurs interact with financiers to fund their projects. Projects can be operated under green or dirty technologies. We explore the role of limited commitment in determining the adoption of green technologies when governments enact carbon taxes and/or directed investment subsidies. We show that entrepreneurial (respectively, financier) limited commitment makes it more (less) costly for governments to encourage green technology adoption. Because green technologies are still at an early stage, the cash flows they generate are back-loaded. Entrepreneurial limited commitment forces consumption to increase over time, thereby undermining risk-sharing and making dirty technologies more attractive. By contrast, under financier limited commitment, the possibility that front-loaded dirty technologies become obsolete forces consumption to decrease over time, thereby impairing risk-sharing and making green technologies more attractive. We also show that carbon taxes (directed technology subsidies) are more cost-effective when entrepreneurs (financiers) display limited commitment.

Suggested Citation

  • Bensoussan, Alain & Chevalier-Roignant, Benoit & Nguyen, Nam & Rivera, Alejandro, 2024. "Financing green entrepreneurs under limited commitment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:168:y:2024:i:c:s0165188924001222
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104930
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    Cited by:

    1. Chevalier-Roignant, Benoît, 2024. "When and how should an incumbent respond to a potentially disruptive event?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sustainable finance; Limited commitment; Optimal taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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