IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v77y2005i2p503-515.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate?

Author

Listed:
  • Torsvik, Gaute

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Torsvik, Gaute, 2005. "Foreign economic aid; should donors cooperate?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 503-515, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:77:y:2005:i:2:p:503-515
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-3878(05)00018-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-1351, December.
    2. Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 46-57, March.
    3. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
    4. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February.
    5. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
    6. David Dollar & Craig Burnside, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September.
    7. Huck, Steffen & Konrad, Kai A. & Muller, Wieland, 2001. "Big fish eat small fish: on merger in Stackelberg markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 213-217, November.
    8. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-227, March.
    9. Karl Pedersen, 2001. "The Samaritan's Dilemma and the Effectiveness of Development Aid," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(5), pages 693-703, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, 2008. "Donor policy rules and aid effectiveness," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1895-1920, June.
    2. Tatyana Deryugina & Barrett Kirwan, 2018. "Does The Samaritan'S Dilemma Matter? Evidence From U.S. Agriculture," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 983-1006, April.
    3. Amegashie, J. Atsu & Ouattara, Bazoumanna & Strobl, Eric, 2007. "Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid," MPRA Paper 3158, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2007.
    4. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2004. "Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics Implications for Aid Selectivity," Working Papers 04-12, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
    5. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2023. "Inside Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma: altruism, strategic courage and ethics of responsibility," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 207-233, June.
    6. HEPP, Ralf, 2010. "CONSEQUENCES OF DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVES IN THE 1990s," Applied Econometrics and International Development, Euro-American Association of Economic Development, vol. 10(1).
    7. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
    8. Qayyum, Unbreen & Din, Musleh-ud & Haider, Adnan, 2014. "Foreign aid, external debt and governance," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 41-52.
    9. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 437-461, August.
    10. Hervé Nenghem Takam & Roger Tsafack Nanfosso, 2024. "Importance of official development assistance in improving the economic cycles of Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa countries," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 4(7), pages 1-22, July.
    11. Temple, Jonathan R.W., 2010. "Aid and Conditionality," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4415-4523, Elsevier.
    12. Almuth Scholl, 2018. "Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Conditionality and Effectiveness," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(339), pages 626-648, July.
    13. Azam, Jean-Paul & Berlinschi, Ruxanda, 2008. "The Aid-Migration of Trade-Off," IDEI Working Papers 538, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    14. Annen, Kurt & Knack, Stephen, 2018. "On the delegation of aid implementation to multilateral agencies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 295-305.
    15. Yasuyuki SAWADA & Hiroyuki YAMADA & Takashi KUROSAKI, 2008. "Is Aid Allocation Consistent with Global Poverty Reduction?: A Cross-Donor Comparison," Discussion papers 08025, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    16. Nagae, Akira & Katayama, Hajime & Takase, Koichi, 2022. "Donor aid allocation and accounting standards of recipients," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    17. Almuth Scholl, 2009. "Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(2), pages 377-391, April.
    18. Azam, Jean-Paul & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Contracting for aid," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-58, February.
    19. Alain Marciano, 2014. "Exploitation, Mutual Advantage and The Myth of the Samaritan's Dilemma," ICER Working Papers 10-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    20. repec:elg:eechap:15325_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:77:y:2005:i:2:p:503-515. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.