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Polarized corporate boards

Author

Listed:
  • Hoang, Thao
  • Ngo, Phong T.H.
  • Zhang, Le

Abstract

We show that political polarization among directors negatively affects corporate board effectiveness by reducing forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Our results are more pronounced in presidential election years and for firms with more monitoring and advising needs. Polarization also increases the departure likelihood for directors who are ideologically distant from the rest of the board, making boards more politically homogeneous over time. Finally, we show that polarization in the boardroom lowers firms' investment-Q sensitivity and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) performance. Our findings highlight the real economic cost of political polarization.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoang, Thao & Ngo, Phong T.H. & Zhang, Le, 2025. "Polarized corporate boards," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:91:y:2025:i:c:s0929119924001597
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102697
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Board of directors; Political polarization; Firm policy; Environmental policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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