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Callable convertible debt under managerial entrenchment

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  • Isagawa, Nobuyuki

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  • Isagawa, Nobuyuki, 2002. "Callable convertible debt under managerial entrenchment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 255-270, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:8:y:2002:i:3:p:255-270
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    1. Stein, Jeremy C., 1992. "Convertible bonds as backdoor equity financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 3-21, August.
    2. Green, Richard C., 1984. "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 115-136, March.
    3. Mikkelson, Wayne H., 1981. "Convertible calls and security returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 237-264, September.
    4. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
    5. Brennan, Michael J & Kraus, Alan, 1987. "Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(5), pages 1225-1243, December.
    6. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli & Yermack, David L, 1997. "Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1411-1438, September.
    7. Jung, Kooyul & Yong-Cheol, Kim & Stulz, Rene M., 1996. "Timing, investment opportunities, managerial discretion, and the security issue decision," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 159-185, October.
    8. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    9. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    10. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    11. Stulz, ReneM., 1990. "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-27, July.
    12. Lee, Inmoo & Loughran, Tim, 1998. "Performance following convertible bond issuance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 185-207, June.
    13. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1985. "A Sequential Signalling Model of Convertible Debt Call Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1263-1281, December.
    14. Mayers, David, 1998. "Why firms issue convertible bonds: the matching of financial and real investment options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 83-102, January.
    15. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    16. Walter Novaes, 2003. "Capital Structure Choice When Managers Are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(1), pages 49-82, January.
    17. Walter Novaes, 2002. "Managerial Turnover and Leverage under a Takeover Threat," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2619-2650, December.
    18. Brennan, M J & Schwartz, Eduardo S, 1977. "Convertible Bonds: Valuation and Optimal Strategies for Call and Conversion," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(5), pages 1699-1715, December.
    19. Jalan, P. & Barone-Adesi, G., 1995. "Equity financing and corporate convertible bond policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 187-206, May.
    20. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1197-1215, December.
    21. Datta, Sudip & Iskandar-Datta, Mai, 1996. "New Evidence on the Valuation Effects of Convertible Bond Calls," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 295-307, June.
    22. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1995. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 567-585, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nobuyuki Isagawa, 2006. "Cross-Shareholding and Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding Under Managerial Entrenchment," Discussion Papers 2006-02, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    2. Liao, Yulu & Huang, Paoyu & Ni, Yensen, 2022. "Convertible bond issuance volume, capital structure, and firm value," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    3. Dutordoir, Marie & Lewis, Craig & Seward, James & Veld, Chris, 2014. "What we do and do not know about convertible bond financing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 3-20.
    4. Dutordoir, Marie & Strong, Norman & Ziegan, Marius C., 2014. "Does corporate governance influence convertible bond issuance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 80-100.
    5. Koziol, Christian & Lawrenz, Jochen, 2010. "Optimal design of rating-trigger step-up bonds: Agency conflicts versus asymmetric information," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 182-204, April.
    6. Elettra Agliardi & Rossella Agliardi & Willem Spanjers, 2015. "Convertible Debt: Financing Decisions and Voluntary Conversion under Ambiguity," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 599-611, December.

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