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Impact of internal governance on investment policy: Evidence from CEO voluntary turnovers

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  • Brick, Ivan E.
  • Palia, Darius
  • Qiao, Yankuo

Abstract

The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that CEO might not make risky long-term investments if the CEO believes that the benefit of such investments would not materialize or is not recognized by the market until after the CEO has retired. This paper tests the predictions of the Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2011) internal governance model to counteract the CEO’s tendency to forego such investments on a sample of voluntary CEO turnovers. We find that the optimal level of sharing of tasks between the CEO and her top-management team, the firm’s internal governance, is dependent on the CEO’s career horizon. Additionally, we find the effect of internal governance only matters for older CEOs. We also find that the closer the internal governance is to the optimal level, the smaller is the underinvestment for an older outgoing CEO. We find that the new incoming CEO divests profitably the assets acquired under good internal governance. Finally, we find that optimal internal governance is found to have positive effects on corporate innovation. Our results are robust to continuous matching by generalized propensity score and controlling for the CEO’s explicit pay-performance sensitivity, succession plan, and pay duration.

Suggested Citation

  • Brick, Ivan E. & Palia, Darius & Qiao, Yankuo, 2024. "Impact of internal governance on investment policy: Evidence from CEO voluntary turnovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:89:y:2024:i:c:s092911992400138x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102676
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