IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v19y2013icp119-139.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Production and hedging implications of executive compensation schemes

Author

Listed:
  • Akron, Sagi
  • Benninga, Simon

Abstract

This paper connects executive compensation with hedging and analyzes a crucial shareholders and managers agency source that evolves from the pricing of the hedging device. The shareholders are risk-neutral, while the risk-averse manager hedges the price risk of the manufactured quantity, and his compensation package includes equity-linked compensation-stock grants. Only when the hedging instrument's pricing includes a risk premium, hedging is costly to the shareholders, while it is costless to the manager. Then from the owners' point of view, we observe managerial over-hedging, increasing in the equity-linked compensation level. This result leads to a violation of the classical production and hedging separation theorem. We conclude that, in the case where the hedging device's pricing bears a risk premium, shareholders can regulate the corporate value diversion to managers through diminishing the managerial equity-linked compensation scheme or by putting restrictions on the extent of hedging activities of executives.

Suggested Citation

  • Akron, Sagi & Benninga, Simon, 2013. "Production and hedging implications of executive compensation schemes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 119-139.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:19:y:2013:i:c:p:119-139
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.10.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119912001034
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.10.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lisa Meulbroek, 2001. "The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 30(2), Summer.
    2. Stulz, René M., 1984. "Optimal Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 127-140, June.
    3. Benninga, Simon Z. & Oosterhof, Casper M., 2004. "Hedging with forwards and puts in complete and incomplete markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-17, January.
    4. Gregory W. Brown & Klaus Bjerre Toft, 2002. "How Firms Should Hedge," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 1283-1324.
    5. Kim, Young Sang & Mathur, Ike & Nam, Jouahn, 2006. "Is operational hedging a substitute for or a complement to financial hedging?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 834-853, September.
    6. Gao, Huasheng, 2010. "Optimal compensation contracts when managers can hedge," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 218-238, August.
    7. Söhnke M. Bartram & Gregory W. Brown & Frank R. Fehle, 2009. "International Evidence on Financial Derivatives Usage," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 38(1), pages 185-206, March.
    8. Mian, Shehzad L., 1996. "Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 419-439, September.
    9. Denis, David J. & Hanouna, Paul & Sarin, Atulya, 2006. "Is there a dark side to incentive compensation?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 467-488, June.
    10. Yanbo Jin & Philippe Jorion, 2006. "Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas Producers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 893-919, April.
    11. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    12. Axel F.A. Adam-Miller & Kit Pont Wong, 2003. "The Impact of Delivery Risk on Optimal Productionand Futures Hedging," Review of Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 459-477.
    13. Anderson, Ronald W & Danthine, Jean-Pierre, 1981. "Cross Hedging," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(6), pages 1182-1196, December.
    14. Murillo Campello & Chen Lin & Yue Ma & Hong Zou, 2011. "The Real and Financial Implications of Corporate Hedging," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1615-1647, October.
    15. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    16. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:1:p:207-225 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. John R. Graham & Daniel A. Rogers, 2002. "Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(2), pages 815-839, April.
    18. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    19. Peter Mackay & Sara B. Moeller, 2007. "The Value of Corporate Risk Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1379-1419, June.
    20. DeMarzo, Peter M & Duffie, Darrell, 1995. "Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 743-771.
    21. Baron, David P, 1970. "Price Uncertainty, Utility, and Industry Equilibrium in Pure Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 11(3), pages 463-480, October.
    22. Tufano, Peter, 1996. "Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1097-1137, September.
    23. Anderson, Ronald W & Danthine, Jean-Pierre, 1980. "Hedging and Joint Production: Theory and Illustrations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 487-498, May.
    24. Tim Adam & Sudipto Dasgupta & Sheridan Titman, 2007. "Financial Constraints, Competition, and Hedging in Industry Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(5), pages 2445-2473, October.
    25. Gary B. Gorton & Fumio Hayashi & K. Geert Rouwenhorst, 2013. "The Fundamentals of Commodity Futures Returns," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 35-105.
    26. Smith, Clifford W. & Stulz, René M., 1985. "The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(4), pages 391-405, December.
    27. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993. "Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1629-1658, December.
    28. Sandmo, Agnar, 1971. "On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 65-73, March.
    29. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    30. Lester G. Telser, 1958. "Futures Trading and the Storage of Cotton and Wheat," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 233-233.
    31. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    32. Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R., 2001. "The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 187-243, May.
    33. Axel F.A. Adam-Müller & Kit Pong Wong, 2003. "The Impact of Delivery Risk on Optimal Production and Futures Hedging," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 7(3), pages 459-477.
    34. John R. Graham & Clifford W. Smith, 1999. "Tax Incentives to Hedge," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 2241-2262, December.
    35. Mehran, Hamid, 1992. "Executive Incentive Plans, Corporate Control, and Capital Structure," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(4), pages 539-560, December.
    36. Holthausen, Duncan M, 1979. "Hedging and the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 989-995, December.
    37. Bettis, J. Carr & Bizjak, John M. & Lemmon, Michael L., 2001. "Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 345-370, September.
    38. Battermann, Harald L. & Braulke, Michael & Broll, Udo & Schimmelpfennig, Jorg, 2000. "The preferred hedge instrument," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 85-91, January.
    39. Nance, Deana R & Smith, Clifford W, Jr & Smithson, Charles W, 1993. "On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 267-284, March.
    40. Chang, Eric C, 1985. "Returns to Speculators and the Theory of Normal Backwardation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(1), pages 193-208, March.
    41. Benninga, Simon & Eldor, Rafael & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1985. "Optimal international hedging in commodity and currency forward markets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 537-552, December.
    42. Adam-Muller, Axel F. A., 1997. "Export and hedging decisions under revenue and exchange rate risk: A note," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 1421-1426, July.
    43. Dusak, Katherine, 1973. "Futures Trading and Investor Returns: An Investigation of Commodity Market Risk Premiums," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(6), pages 1387-1406, Nov.-Dec..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Akron, Sagi, 2019. "The optimal derivative-based corporate hedging strategies under equity-linked managerial compensation," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    2. Mohammad Al‐Shboul & Sajid Anwar, 2014. "Foreign exchange rate exposure: Evidence from Canada," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(1), pages 18-29, January.
    3. Lien, Donald & Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey), 2017. "Production and hedging with optimism and pessimism under ambiguity," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 122-135.
    4. Choe, Chongwoo & Lien, Donald & Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey), 2015. "Optimal managerial hedging and contracting with self-esteem concerns," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 354-367.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Akron, Sagi, 2019. "The optimal derivative-based corporate hedging strategies under equity-linked managerial compensation," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    2. Cornaggia, Jess, 2013. "Does risk management matter? Evidence from the U.S. agricultural industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 419-440.
    3. Chen, Jun & King, Tao-Hsien Dolly, 2014. "Corporate hedging and the cost of debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 221-245.
    4. Marcel Boyer, 2017. "Méthodes avancées d’évaluation d’investissements / Advanced Methods of Investment Evaluation - Tome 2," CIRANO Monographs, CIRANO, number 2017mo-04, January.
    5. Andreas Röthig, 2009. "Microeconomic Risk Management and Macroeconomic Stability," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer, number 978-3-642-01565-6, July.
    6. Mohamed Mnasri & Georges Dionne & Jean-Pierre Gueyie, 2013. "The Maturity Structure of Corporate Hedging: the Case of the U.S. Oil and Gas Industry," Cahiers de recherche 1337, CIRPEE.
    7. Bartram, Söhnke M. & Brown, Gregory W. & Conrad, Jennifer, 2011. "The Effects of Derivatives on Firm Risk and Value," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(4), pages 967-999, August.
    8. Oberoi, Jaideep, 2018. "Interest rate risk management and the mix of fixed and floating rate debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 70-86.
    9. Lutz Hahnenstein & Klaus Röder, 2007. "Who hedges more when leverage is endogenous? A testable theory of corporate risk management under general distributional conditions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 353-391, May.
    10. Adam-Müller, Axel F.A. & Nolte, Ingmar, 2011. "Cross hedging under multiplicative basis risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 2956-2964, November.
    11. Carter, David A. & Rogers, Daniel A. & Simkins, Betty J. & Treanor, Stephen D., 2017. "A review of the literature on commodity risk management," Journal of Commodity Markets, Elsevier, vol. 8(C), pages 1-17.
    12. Kuersten, Wolfgang & Linde, Rainer, 2011. "Corporate hedging versus risk-shifting in financially constrained firms: The time-horizon matters!," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 502-525, June.
    13. Gunratan Lonare & Ahmet Nart & Ahmet M. Tuncez, 2022. "Industry tournament incentives and corporate hedging policies," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 399-453, June.
    14. Chongwu Xia & Chuyi Yang & Lei Zhang, 2021. "The real effect of foreign exchange hedging on corporate innovation," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(12), pages 2046-2078, December.
    15. BOYER, Marcel & BOYER, Martin M. & GARCIA, René, 2010. "The Alleviation of Coordination Problems through Financial Risk Management," Cahiers de recherche 06-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    16. Söhnke M. Bartram & Gregory W. Brown & Frank R. Fehle, 2009. "International Evidence on Financial Derivatives Usage," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 38(1), pages 185-206, March.
    17. Mnasri, Mohamed & Dionne, Georges & Gueyie, Jean-Pierre, 2013. "How do firms hedge risks? Empirical evidence from U.S. oil and gas producers," Working Papers 13-3, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    18. Jerome Geyer-Klingeberg & Markus Hang & Andreas W. Rathgeber & Stefan Stöckl & Matthias Walter, 2018. "What do we really know about corporate hedging? A meta-analytical study," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, February.
    19. Maria João Jorge & Mário Gomes Augusto, 2011. "The Value Of Hedging Through Corporate Governance: A Literature Review And Directions For Future Research," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(2), pages 113-130.
    20. Liu Hong & Yongjia Li & Kangzhen Xie & Claire J. Yan, 2020. "On the Market Timing of Hedging: Evidence from U.S. Oil and Gas Producers," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 297-334, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal managerial compensation scheme; Corporate hedging devices; Executive equity-linked compensation; Frictions; Regulation; Separation theorems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:19:y:2013:i:c:p:119-139. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.