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Termination risk and managerial risk taking

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  • Chakraborty, Atreya
  • Sheikh, Shahbaz
  • Subramanian, Narayanan

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  • Chakraborty, Atreya & Sheikh, Shahbaz & Subramanian, Narayanan, 2007. "Termination risk and managerial risk taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 170-188, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:13:y:2007:i:1:p:170-188
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