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Inside ownership beyond the IPO: the evolution of corporate ownership concentration

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  • Harjoto, Maretno
  • Garen, John

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  • Harjoto, Maretno & Garen, John, 2005. "Inside ownership beyond the IPO: the evolution of corporate ownership concentration," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 661-679, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:11:y:2005:i:4:p:661-679
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    5. Field, Laura Casares & Sheehan, Dennis P., 2004. "IPO underpricing and outside blockholdings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 263-280, March.
    6. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 377-397, September.
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    14. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
    15. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February.
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    24. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, "undated". "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 08-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    25. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1995. "Equity ownership and the two faces of debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 131-157, September.
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    1. Robert H. Edelstein & Antoni Sureda‐Gomila & Branko Urošević & Nicholas Wonder, 2010. "Ownership Dynamics with Multiple Insiders: The Case of REITs," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 57-90, March.
    2. Wolf Wagner, 2010. "Divestment, Entrepreneurial Incentives, and the Life Cycle of the Firm," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(5-6), pages 591-611.
    3. Khine Kyaw & Steen Thomsen & Sirimon Treepongkaruna, 2022. "Firms' potential for economic sustainability and firm value: The moderating role of blockholders," Sustainable Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(5), pages 884-901, October.
    4. Roosenboom, P.G.J. & Schramade, W.L.J., 2005. "The Price Of Power: Valuing The Controlling Position Of Owner-Managers In French Ipo Firms," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2005-011-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    5. Ching-Chih Wu & Tung-Hsiao Yang, 2018. "Insider Trading and Institutional Holdings in Seasoned Equity Offerings," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-14, September.
    6. Rihab Kriaa & Taher Hamza, 2021. "Control dilution of an initial owner post-IPO: the impact of characteristics of ownership structure," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 1-35, March.
    7. Wolf Wagner, 2010. "Divestment, Entrepreneurial Incentives, and the Life Cycle of the Firm," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(5‐6), pages 591-611, June.

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