Multi-games on a dynamic network and the evolution of cooperation

Although multi-games have been demonstrated to be efficacious in eliciting cooperative behaviors, the preponderance of related research has been circumscribed to static networks. In order to more precisely reflect real-world scenarios, this study formulates multi-games within a dynamic network framework, meticulously devising the evolution rules for the network structure and corresponding strategy evolution schemes. Experimental data disclose a pronounced augmentation in the cooperation of multi-games within a dynamic network in contrast to static ones. The impetus underlying this phenomenon resides in the dynamic fluctuations of the network degree distribution, which functions as an “invisible guiding hand”, gently propelling strategies towards cooperation. As a result, cooperation progressively preponderate and disseminate widely, instigating the continuous amelioration of the network structure and engendering a more conducive environment for the further evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, the research has ascertained that a greater sucker's payoff value is conducive to more effectively promoting cooperation. Additionally, when more participants partake in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, the cooperation ascends further. Finally, this study undertakes an incisive analysis of the mechanisms buttressing the significant enhancement of cooperation, with the aim of furnishing robust support for the synchronous advancement of theory and practice in this domain.