IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/chsofr/v189y2024ip1s0960077924012451.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fostering cooperative evolution through probabilistic punishment and environmental feedback in public goods game

Author

Listed:
  • Liu, Jiaqi
  • Zhang, Qianwei
  • Tang, Rui

Abstract

Punishing selfish individuals is regarded as an effective method to maintain social cooperation. In reality, the corresponding punishment probability should vary with different game environments. However, most current research treats this probability as a constant or exogenously given. In this paper, based on the public goods game, we design an environmental feedback mechanism and establish a feedback evolutionary game model. The model assumes that the probability of punishing defectors will change with the proportion of cooperators, ultimately influencing individual decision-making. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulations, we obtain three stable states of the system under different parameter conditions: a state of complete defection with low punishment probability, a state of complete cooperation with high punishment probability, and a bistable state. Our research results indicate that the environmental feedback mechanism plays a crucial role in promoting long-term social stability and sustainable development.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Jiaqi & Zhang, Qianwei & Tang, Rui, 2024. "Fostering cooperative evolution through probabilistic punishment and environmental feedback in public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 189(P1).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:189:y:2024:i:p1:s0960077924012451
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115693
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077924012451
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115693?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:189:y:2024:i:p1:s0960077924012451. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thayer, Thomas R. (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/chaos-solitons-and-fractals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.