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The bright side of common ownership: Evidence from bank transparency

Author

Listed:
  • Park, Haerang
  • Pathan, Shams
  • Stathopoulos, Konstantinos
  • Marwick, Alex

Abstract

Over 74% of US banks share common ownership with other banks. Our analysis of a large sample of US banks reveals that those with greater common ownership demonstrate heightened transparency. This manifests as reduced discretion in loan loss provisions, improved financial statement readability, and enhanced comparability. We pinpoint three underlying mechanisms: decreased private information gathering, increased stock liquidity, and diminished managerial incentives for opacity. Furthermore, these commonly owned banks exhibit lower crash risk due to their improved transparency. Our findings hold after using various proxies and two endogeneity-reduction methods: a difference-in-differences analysis based on the 2009 Blackrock–Barclays Global Investors merger and an instrumental variable approach using Russell 2000 index inclusions. Overall, our study underscores the positive impact of common ownership in the banking sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Park, Haerang & Pathan, Shams & Stathopoulos, Konstantinos & Marwick, Alex, 2024. "The bright side of common ownership: Evidence from bank transparency," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:bracre:v:56:y:2024:i:6:s0890838924002099
    DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101445
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Loan loss provisions; Common ownership; Managerial incentives; Readability; Comparability of financial statements; Private information gathering; Stock liquidity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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