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Director networks, accounting conservatism and director reputation: Evidence after financial reporting failure

Author

Listed:
  • Liu, Chih-Liang
  • Lai, Shu-Miao
  • Haw, In-Mu

Abstract

This study examines whether connected boards of directors restore their reputation via conservative accounting after financial misstatements. Using a sample of restating firms from 2004 to 2020, we find central boards of directors are positively related to accounting conservatism in the post-restatement period. More importantly, we find accounting conservatism has positive effects on the reputation restoration of directors in central boards, leading to more prestigious board seats, additional outside directorships, and higher compensation following restatements. The reputation recovery of directors in central boards is more prominent among restating firms that seek external financing where potential benefits of director reputation are greater. The findings suggest that directors in central boards successfully recover their damaged reputation via conservative accounting after restatements and minimize adverse consequences in the director market. Our robustness tests support the causal interpretation of our evidence. Collectively, our study offers novel insights into the monitoring incentives resulted from the reputation restoration of directors in central boards via conservative accounting after financial reporting failures.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Chih-Liang & Lai, Shu-Miao & Haw, In-Mu, 2024. "Director networks, accounting conservatism and director reputation: Evidence after financial reporting failure," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:bracre:v:56:y:2024:i:6:s0890838924001847
    DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101421
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Director reputation; Board networks; Accounting conservatism; Restatements; Outside directorships; Compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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