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Generals in defense of allocation: Coups and military budgets in Thailand

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  • Kawaura, Akihiko

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of military coups d’état on government defense expenditure in Thailand using data from 1948 to 2015. The Thai military staged nine successful coups during this period, which allows an empirical inquiry in a single-country framework. Regression analyses of the defense budget reveal that successful coups result in large defense budget changes in the two years that follow. Among the three branches of the Thai armed forces, the army has gained the most in terms of budget allocations after coups relative to the navy and air force. This finding is consistent with the observation that the army has been the dominant force in the history of the military in the country. These results imply that coup leaders have made use of acquired executive power to direct more resources to their organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Kawaura, Akihiko, 2018. "Generals in defense of allocation: Coups and military budgets in Thailand," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 72-78.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:asieco:v:58:y:2018:i:c:p:72-78
    DOI: 10.1016/j.asieco.2018.07.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Akihiko Kawaura, 2011. "Legislator Incentives In A Fragile Democracy: Evidence From Budget Allocation In Thailand," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(3), pages 407-415, July.
    2. Gabriel Leon, 2014. "Loyalty for sale? Military spending and coups d’etat," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 363-383, June.
    3. Vincenzo Bove & Roberto Nisticò, 2014. "Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(3), pages 321-344, December.
    4. Bhanupong Nidhiprabha, 2015. "Lessons from Thailand's Fiscal Policy," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 14(3), pages 110-125, Fall.
    5. Jonathan M Powell & Clayton L Thyne, 2011. "Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 48(2), pages 249-259, March.
    6. Bove, Vincenzo & Nisticò, Roberto, 2014. "Military in politics and budgetary allocations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 1065-1078.
    7. Zuk, Gary & Thompson, William R., 1982. "The Post-Coup Military Spending Question: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 60-74, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Suwanprasert, Wisarut, 2023. "Consequences of Thailand’s 2006 military coup: Evidence from the synthetic control method," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Wisarut Suwanprasert, 2024. "The economic aftermath of Thailand's 2014 military coup: Evidence from the synthetic control method," Asian Economic Journal, East Asian Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 256-283, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coupd’état; Thailand; Budget; Military;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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