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The impact of cost uncertainty on Cournot oligopoly game with concave demand function

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  • Askar, S.S.

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a Cournot oligopoly game where quantity-setting firm uses non-linear demand function that has no inflection points. A random cost function is introduced in this model. In the model, a monopolistic firm uses an unknown demand function. The equilibrium point of the model is obtained and its dynamical characteristics such as stability, bifurcation and chaos are investigated. Complete stability and bifurcation analysis are provided. The obtained theoretical results are verified by numerical simulation.

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  • Askar, S.S., 2014. "The impact of cost uncertainty on Cournot oligopoly game with concave demand function," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 232(C), pages 144-149.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:232:y:2014:i:c:p:144-149
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2014.01.097
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    Cited by:

    1. Jian Ni & Lap Keung Chu & Shoude Li, 2018. "Financial hedging and competitive strategy for value-maximizing firms under quantity competition," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 264(1), pages 391-407, May.
    2. Elsadany, A.A., 2017. "Dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality based on relative profit maximization," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 294(C), pages 253-263.
    3. Askar, S.S. & Alshamrani, Ahmad M. & Alnowibet, K., 2015. "Dynamic Cournot duopoly games with nonlinear demand function," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 259(C), pages 427-437.
    4. Askar, S.S. & Alshamrani, Ahmad M. & Alnowibet, K., 2016. "The arising of cooperation in Cournot duopoly games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 273(C), pages 535-542.

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