IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v76y2008i2p437-442.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Investment Reversibility and Agency Cost of Debt

Author

Listed:
  • Gustavo Manso

Abstract

Previous research has argued that debt financing affects equity-holders' investment decisions, producing substantial inefficiency. This paper shows that the size of this inefficiency depends on the degree of investment reversibility. In a dynamic model of financing and investment, the paper provides an upper bound for the inefficiency produced by debt financing. The upper bound is decreasing in the degree of investment reversibility and is zero when investment is perfectly reversible. Copyright The Econometric Society 2008.

Suggested Citation

  • Gustavo Manso, 2008. "Investment Reversibility and Agency Cost of Debt," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 437-442, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:76:y:2008:i:2:p:437-442
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00838.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hui Chen & Gustavo Manso, 2017. "Macroeconomic Risk and Debt Overhang," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 1-38.
    2. Jae Sim & Egon Zakrajsek & Simon Gilchrist, 2010. "Uncertainty, Financial Frictions, and Investment Dynamics," 2010 Meeting Papers 1285, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Keskinsoy, Bilal, 2017. "Taxi, Takeoff and Landing: Behavioural Patterns of Capital Flows to Emerging Markets," MPRA Paper 78129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Dirk Hackbarth & Alejandro Rivera & Tak-Yuen Wong, 2022. "Optimal Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(9), pages 6477-6505, September.
    5. Décamps, Jean-Paul & Gryglewicz, S. & Morellec, E. & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2015. "Corporate Policies with Temporary and Permanent Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 843, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Mar 2016.
    6. Décamps, Jean Paul & Morellec, Erwan & Villeneuve, Stéphane & Gryglewicz, Sebastian, 2015. "Corporate policies with permanent and temporary shocks," CEPR Discussion Papers 10420, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Frantz, Pascal & Instefjord, Norvald, 2019. "Debt overhang and non-distressed debt restructuring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90212, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Frantz, Pascal & Instefjord, Norvald, 2019. "Debt overhang and non-distressed debt restructuring," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 75-88.
    9. Priyank Gandhi, 2018. "The relation between bank credit growth and the expected returns of bank stocks," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 24(4), pages 610-649, September.
    10. Hugonnier, Julien & Malamud, Semyon & Morellec, Erwan, 2015. "Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1130-1158.
    11. Omar Besbes & Dan A. Iancu & Nikolaos Trichakis, 2018. "Dynamic Pricing Under Debt: Spiraling Distortions and Efficiency Losses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4572-4589, October.
    12. Winston Wei Dou & Yan Ji, 2021. "External Financing and Customer Capital: A Financial Theory of Markups," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5569-5585, September.
    13. Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard & Viput Ongsakul & Pornsit Jiraporn, 2022. "Do hostile takeover threats matter? Evidence from credit ratings," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(1), pages 1-20, January.
    14. Dan A. Iancu & Nikolaos Trichakis & Gerry Tsoukalas, 2017. "Is Operating Flexibility Harmful Under Debt?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(6), pages 1730-1761, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:76:y:2008:i:2:p:437-442. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.