Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein 'Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium'
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Other versions of this item:
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1998. "Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"," Economic theory and game theory 007, Nir Dagan.
- Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, "undated". "Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium"," Economic theory and game theory 001, Oscar Volij.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2010.
"How Optimism Leads to Price Discovery and Efficiency in a Dynamic Matching Market,"
Working Papers
10004, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
- Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Shneyerov, Art & Xie, Huan, 2010. "How Optimism Leads to Price Discovery and Efficiency in a Dynamic Matching Market," Microeconomics.ca working papers artyom_shneyerov-2010-32, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 26 Oct 2010.
- Serrano, Roberto, 2002.
"Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 65-89, September.
- Serrano, R. & Yosha, O., 1995. "Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome : A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values," Papers 26-95, Tel Aviv.
- Roberto Serrano, 2000. "Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome:A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values," Working Papers 2000-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2004.
"Bargaining and competition revisited,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 78-88, March.
- Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Bargaining and Competition Revisited," Working Papers 2002-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2000.
"Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 79-106, November.
- Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2000. "Walrasian Allocations Without Price-Taking Behavior," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5168, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2016. "An optimistic search equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 89-114, June.
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