Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games: A Comment
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Cited by:
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2000. "Learning, Memory, and Inertia," Vienna Economics Papers 0003, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, 2008. "Learning, bounded memory, and inertia," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 134-136, November.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Fei Shi, 2012. "Imitation with asymmetric memory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 193-215, January.
- William H. Sandholm, 1996. "Simple and Clever Decision Rules in Single Population Evolutionary Models," Discussion Papers 1158, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ludo Waltman & Nees Eck & Rommert Dekker & Uzay Kaymak, 2011.
"Economic modeling using evolutionary algorithms: the effect of a binary encoding of strategies,"
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(5), pages 737-756, December.
- Waltman, L. & van Eck, N.J.P. & Dekker, R. & Kaymak, U., 2009. "Economic Modeling Using Evolutionary Algorithms: The Effect of a Binary Encoding of Strategies," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2009-028-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 2000.
"The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 274-299, June.
- Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 1997. "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Working Papers 97-34, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok & Rajiv Sethi, 1997. "On the Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Game Theory and Information 9708001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Aug 1997.
- Sandholm, William H., 1998. "Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 165-170, November.
- Alexander F. Tieman & Harold Houba, 1998. "A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information 9809002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hehenkamp, Burkhard & Wambach, Achim, 2010.
"Survival at the center--The stability of minimum differentiation,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 853-858, December.
- Burkhard Hehenkamp & Achim Wambach, 2010. "Survival at the Center - The Stability of Minimum Differentiation," Post-Print hal-00911820, HAL.
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