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Social Contract I: Harsani and Rawls

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  • Binmore, Ken

Abstract

This paper analyzes the bargaining problem faced by two individuals in the Rawlsian original position along strictly Rawlsian lines. The resulting model closely resembles that used by J. Harsanyi in defending utilitarianism. Three difficulties with Harsanyi's version of the model are identified. These concern the underlying symmetry assumption, the origin of the necessary interpersonal comparison of utility, and the reasons why individuals should be regarded as committed to the "social contract" negotiated in the original position. The paper seeks to resolve the first two difficulties by supposing that the "extended sympathy preferences" required in Harsanyi's model are chosen strategically by evolutionary forces. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Binmore, Ken, 1989. "Social Contract I: Harsani and Rawls," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(395), pages 84-102, Supplemen.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:99:y:1989:i:395:p:84-102
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    Cited by:

    1. Maître Philippe, 1999. "La Notion D'equite : Une Revue," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 107-130, March.
    2. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2014. "Correlated Equilibrium, Conformity, and Stereotyping in Social Groups," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(5), pages 743-766, October.
    3. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2014. "Correlated Equilibrium, Conformity, and Stereotyping in Social Groups," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(5), pages 743-766, October.
    4. Marco Faillo & Stefania Ottone & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2015. "The social contract in the laboratory. An experimental analysis of self-enforcing impartial agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 225-246, June.
    5. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 463-478, November.
    6. Thibault Gajdos & Feriel Kandil, 2008. "The ignorant observer," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 193-232, August.
    7. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2013. "Ethics, economic organization and the social contract," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Magali Fia & Lorenzo Sacconi, 2019. "Justice and Corporate Governance: New Insights from Rawlsian Social Contract and Sen’s Capabilities Approach," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 160(4), pages 937-960, December.
    9. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2008. "Conformity, Equity and Correlated Equilibrium," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0806, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    10. Thibault Gajdos & Feriel Kandil, 2006. "The Ignorant Observer," Post-Print halshs-00115722, HAL.
    11. Wolf, Stephan & Dron, Cameron, 2020. "The effect of an experimental veil of ignorance on intergenerational resource sharing: empirical evidence from a sequential multi-person dictator game," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).

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