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Skill Signalling with Product Market Externality

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  • Mikko Leppämäki
  • Mikko Mustonen

Abstract

We propose that signalling in professional labour markets creates product market externalities that affect wages, thus establishing a link between the externality and signalling incentives. Due to signalling activity, a free substitute (negative externality) or complement (positive externality) good appears. For negative or mildly positive externalities, the standard result of signalling at the minimum level obtains. When the positive externality is sufficiently strong, separation occurs, in contrast to the literature, at the maximum rather than at the minimum level of signalling. Very strong positive externalities imply the unique maximum pooling equilibrium. The private market solution may involve too little signalling when compared to the social optimum. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikko Leppämäki & Mikko Mustonen, 2009. "Skill Signalling with Product Market Externality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1130-1142, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:119:y:2009:i:539:p:1130-1142
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    Cited by:

    1. Schmidbauer, Eric & Lubensky, Dmitry, 2018. "New and improved?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 26-48.
    2. Rachel Soloveichik, 2024. "Private Funding of “Free” Data: A Theoretical Framework," BEA Papers 0125, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
    3. Vineet Kumar & Brett R. Gordon & Kannan Srinivasan, 2011. "Competitive Strategy for Open Source Software," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(6), pages 1066-1078, November.

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