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The Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market: A Note

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  • Xu, Bin

Abstract

Hillier and Worrall (1994) derived a surprising result that credit should be further rationed in the costly-monitoring credit-rationing equilibrium. This note shows that their result may be reversed if monitoring costs are endogenously determined.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Bin, 2000. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market: A Note," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 576-580, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:110:y:2000:i:463:p:576-80
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Becchetti, Leonardo & Sierra, Jaime, 2003. "Bankruptcy risk and productive efficiency in manufacturing firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(11), pages 2099-2120, November.
    3. Urs W. Birchler, 2000. "Are banks excessively monitored?," Working Papers 00.14, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    4. Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay, 2002. "Costly state verification and optimal investment," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 26(3), pages 233-248, September.

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