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A Signalling Theory of Nominal Wage Inflexibility

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  • Laing, Derek

Abstract

A model of learning in local labor markets is constructed in which the emphasis placed by employers on job applicants' employment histories induces workers to reject low nominal wages to avoid subsequently signalling a low ability. This 'wage censoring'behavior leads to inefficiently high levels of unemployment and generates an apparent downwardly inflexible nominal wage. Monetary policy may be of use if it affects the quality of the nominal wage signal. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Laing, Derek, 1993. "A Signalling Theory of Nominal Wage Inflexibility," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(421), pages 1493-1510, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:103:y:1993:i:421:p:1493-1510
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    Cited by:

    1. Wapler, Rüdiger, 2000. "Unions, monopolistic competition and unemployment," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 180, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    2. Brian Snowdon & Howard Vane, 1995. "New-Keynesian Economics Today: The Empire Strikes Back," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 39(1), pages 48-65, March.
    3. Wapler, Rüdiger, 2001. "Unions, efficiency wages, and unemployment," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 210, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.

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