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Heterogeneous capital ownership, partial democracy and political support for immigration

Author

Listed:
  • Subhayu Bandyopadhyay

    (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)

  • Devashish Mitra

    (Syracuse University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes and compares equilibrium immigration levels of some popular political economy models in the context of unequal capital holdings. We show that immigration rises (falls) with inequality in a limited (inclusive) democracy where only a small (large) fraction of the population has voting rights. Furthermore, we highlight the similarities between a campaign contributions model and a partial democracy model in terms of their predictions about immigration policy. In particular, we show that extension of voting rights in a partial democracy has qualitatively similar implications on immigration policy as reducing the relative weight on campaign contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Devashish Mitra, 2024. "Heterogeneous capital ownership, partial democracy and political support for immigration," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 44(4), pages 1492-1499.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-24-00450
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2024/Volume44/EB-24-V44-I4-P119.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. José Tavares, 2008. "Trade, Factor Proportions, and Political Rights," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(1), pages 163-168, February.
    3. Milner, Helen V. & Kubota, Keiko, 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 107-143, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal immigration policy; Inequality in capital ownership; Partial democracy; Voter support for immigration; Campaign contributions; Lobbying.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
    • J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers

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