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A note on Cournot equilibria under incomplete information

Author

Listed:
  • Alexey Shvedov

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

The usual assumptions that underlie the theory of Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under incomplete information are that the rivals' marginal costs are independently and identically distributed. Using a new mathematical method, this paper shows that the Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists under much more general conditions. An expression of equilibrium solutions is presented. Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under incomplete information are that the rivals' marginal costs are independently and identically distributed. Using a new mathematical method, this paper shows that the Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists under much more general conditions. An expression of equilibrium solutions is presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexey Shvedov, 2022. "A note on Cournot equilibria under incomplete information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(2), pages 788-792.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-22-00130
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2022/Volume42/EB-22-V42-I2-P66.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot competition; Equilibrium strategy; Incomplete information; Random variable;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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