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Technology improvement and market structure alteration

Author

Listed:
  • Sugata Marjit

    (Centre for Studies in Social Sciences (CSSSC), Kolkata, India)

  • Suryaprakash Misra

    (National Law University, Delhi)

  • Dyuti S Banerjee

    (Monash University)

Abstract

In this paper we show that the increasing marginal cost assumption removes the infeasibility of market structure alteration that is present under the constant marginal cost assumption. Specifically, in an infinitely repeated game with increasing marginal cost, we show that technological improvement has the potential to switch the market structure from collusion to Cournot generating additional welfare gains.

Suggested Citation

  • Sugata Marjit & Suryaprakash Misra & Dyuti S Banerjee, 2017. "Technology improvement and market structure alteration," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(2), pages 1106-1112.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-16-00868
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Suryaprakash Mishra, 2024. "Entry, market structures and welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 267-276, August.
    2. Sugata Marjit & Suryaprakash Mishra, 2020. "Quadratic Costs, Innovation and Welfare: The Role of Technology," CESifo Working Paper Series 8524, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Infinitely Repeated Game; Market Structures; Technology.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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